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In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to 
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an 
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which 
must be made available to all on equal terms. 
Brown v. Board of Education! 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Education has long been recognized by our society to be of vital importance. It 
provides the basis for opportunity and advancement, and is a necessity in guaranteeing 
the right to self-determination. Nonetheless, the right of every citizen to receive an 
education is neither explicitly nor implicitly guaranteed in the United States Constitution. 
Instead the job of educating has been the function of state governments, and every state 
constitution contains an explicit provision guaranteeing education for its citizens.2 State 
constitutional provisions for education, however, vary in terms of the substance of the 
right; some merely establish that a public school system will exist in the state, while 
others contain language such as a guarantee of a "thorough and efficient" or "general 
and uniform" system of public schools.3 Thus, the kind and quality of education that a 
state must make available to children is often poorly defined, and state constitutional 
provisions leave legislators free to interpret and implement such provisions with a great 
deal of flexibility. 
1347 U.S. 483,493 (1954). 
2 See e.g., MICH. CONST. art. VIII, § 2; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3; ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
5 See e.g., CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1, "to provide free public elementary and secondary schools 
in the state"; N.J. CONST. 1947 art. VIII, § IV, par. 1, "maintenance and support of a thorough 
and efficient system of free public schools"; OR. CONST. art. VIII, § 3, "establishment of a uniform 
and general system of Common schools". 
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Public school systems are failing to do the job of educating. Adult illiteracy is 
recognized as a serious problem facing the United States today as more and more 
children leave public school systems without possessing even a basic education.4 It is 
impossible to conclude that all public school systems in this country are fulfilling their 
obligation to educate. 
Significantly contributing to the failure to educate is the method by which public 
schools are financed. 5 In the vast majority of states a large portion of public school 
funding is provided by local property tax revenues. This creates gross inequities between 
school districts in the amount of money available to spend on education in each district 
and, therefore, the kind and quality of that education. This Note will examine the 
constitutionality of public school financing systems which are based in part on local 
property tax. First, it will discuss the Supreme Court's analysis of such systems under 
the United States Constitution. Next, it will examine the various ways in which state 
courts have interpreted state constitutional standards and applied their analyses to 
challenges of these financing schemes. Finally, this Note will argue that courts should 
examine constitutional challenges to public school financing systems using intermediate 
judicial scrutiny. 
II. LOCAL PROPERTY TAX AS THE BASIS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING 
Public schools are largely financed by local taxes based on property value, supple-
mented by state and federal contributions. Thus, school districts in neighborhoods of 
relatively low property values have less money available to fund the education of children 
who live in such neighborhoods than those in areas of higher property values. For 
example, the wealthiest school district in New York spent $4214.00 per pupil in the 
academic year 1974-75; the poorest spent $396.00 on each child, a difference of 4.5 to 
1.6 Many other states have similar disparities. 7 State systems that allow for such disparities 
in educational quality are in essence creating a permanent underclass of poor and 
uneducated citizens. These children are being denied, because of their wealth or the 
wealth of their neighbors, the same quality of education being made available to wealthier 
citizens. Thus, children living in neighborhoods of low property value are being denied 
the same opportunity to participate, compete and excel in society that is available to 
children who reside in districts with higher property values. Public school financing 
systems based on property tax serve to perpetuate a class of poorly educated, low income 
and underachieving citizens, and maintain the opportunity for advancement and achieve-
ment for those who can afford to pay more for it. 
• For a general discussion, see Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective 
Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEXAS L. REv. 777, 779-794 (1985). 
5 For a thorough dicussion of the correlation between public school financing and academic 
achievement, see id. 
6 Board of Educ., Levittown, Etc. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 56, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 657-58, 439 
N.E.2d 359, 373 (1982). 
7 For example, during the academic year 1978-79, the wealthiest district in Maryland spent 
$2328.00 per pupil, while the poorest district spent $1498.00. See Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Board 
of Educ. 295 Md. 597, 613, 458 A.2d 758, 767 (1983). In West Virginia, the disparity during the 
academic year 1977-78 was $1428.00 to $832.00. See Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.Va. 672, 734, 255 
S.E.2d 859, 892 (1979). 
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III. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARD IN PUBLIC SCHOOL 
FINANCING CASES 
123 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, established the federal equal protection 
standard to be utilized in constitutional challenges to public school financing systems 
which are based on property tax.8 In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 
the parent plaintiffs brought a class action suit on behalf of schoolchildren throughout 
the state who were poor and resided in school districts having a low property tax base. 
The plaintiffs claimed that the Texas system, under which approximately 41 % of edu-
cational expenditures came from local property taxes, created a discriminatory class 
against those persons residing in school districts that had low property tax bases because 
it resulted in substantially less money available for the education of students in poorer 
districts than in wealthy districts. 9 The most affluent school district in San Antonio spent 
$594.00 per pupil for the 1967-68 school year; in the poorest district only $356.00 was 
spent on each pupil. 10 The Texas' system's reliance on local property tax, it was therefore 
alleged, favored the more affluent and violated equal protection requirements because 
of substantial interdistrict disparities in per pupil expenditures. The plaintiffs alleged 
that education is a fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and 
that because the state's system provided for education based on a citizen's wealth, they 
were also a suspect class. 11 Accordingly, under the Supreme Court's two tiered equal 
protection analysis,I2 the plaintiffs claimed that the Court must strictly scrutinize the 
Texas system and uphold it only if the state could demonstrate a compelling state interest 
to justify the unequal treatment. 
In determining the level of review to be utilized in the analysis of the constitutionality 
of the Texas legislature's system, the Court found that strict scrutiny was improper. IS 
According to the Court, the plaintiffs were neither a suspect class,14 nor was education 
a fundamental right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution. IS The Court failed to find that 
the plaintiffs were a suspect class for several reasons. First, the plaintiffs did not claim 
to be suffering from the absolute denial of a right; rather their claim was of unequal 
opportunity to exercise that right. I6 In addition, the Court described the plaintiffs as a 
"large, diverse, and amorphous class, unified only by the common factor of residence in 
districts that happen to have less taxable wealth than other districts."17 In determining 
whether the plaintiffs' claim involved a fundamental right, the Court stated that "the 
answer lies in assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly 
8 San Antonio Independent School District et al. v. Rodriguez, et aI., 411 V.S. 1 (1972). 
9 Id. at 5. 
IOId. at 12, 13. 
IIId. at 17. 
12 The Court examines whether the plaintiff's claim involves a fundamental right or a suspect 
classification. In the case of either the Court will strictly scrutinize the challenged scheme and 
require the state to demonstrate a compelling interest to justify the unequal treatment. Where 
neither a fundamental right nor a suspect classification is involved, the Court applies minimum 
judicial scrutiny and the state must only show that there is a rational relationship between the state's 
interest and the means employed to achieve that interest. 
13 Rodriguez, 411 V.S. at 28. 
I4Id. 
IS Id. at 36. 
I6Id. at 25. 
17Id. at 28. 
124 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORm LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8:121 
provided for in the Constitution."18 The Court found, however, that education is neither 
explicitly provided for in the Constitution, nor is it implicitly guaranteed. 
The Court instead applied minimum judicial scrutiny to the plaintiffs' claim and 
found that the state's interest in promoting local control over school systems constituted 
a legitimate state purpose, and that Texas' financing scheme bore a rational relation to 
that purpose.19 Benefits of local control include freedom to devote more money to 
education than the minimum provided by the state system, participation by local residents 
in the decision-making process concerning the way in which local tax dollars should be 
spent, and an opportunity for experimentation, innovation and competition for educa-
tional excellence.2o Therefore, because the system did not impose invidious discrimina-
tion in violation of the fourteenth amendment, it was upheld.21 
IV. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS IN PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING CASES 
Since Rodriguez, a number of actions have been brought in state courts challenging 
the constitutionality of public school financing systems which rely in part on local prop-
erty taxes.22 These suits have alleged that present systems violate state and federal equal 
protection guarantees, as well as clauses in state constitutions that provide for public 
education.2s Courts in all states have refused to apply federal equal protection to plaintiffs 
based on the Supreme Court decision in Rodriguez. Courts have found, however, that 
state constitutions can provide a heightened level of equal protection to its citizens, and 
that the federal Constitution merely establishes the minimum.24 In addition, education 
clauses in state constitutions make public education an explicitly guaranteed right, unlike 
the federal Constitution which makes no such guarantee. State courts have analyzed 
education financing systems with varying degrees of judicial scrutiny, and such challenges 
have been unsuccessful in a minority of states, while successful in the majority. 
A. Successful Cases 
1. New Jersey: Robinson v. Cahill 
In 1973, the New Jersey decision of Robinson v. Cahill presented the first successful 
challenge to a state's public school financing scheme following the Supreme Court's 
decision in Rodriguez.2s The plaintiffs, who were residents, taxpayers, and school officials 
18 [d. at 33. 
19 [d. at 44. 
20 [d. at 50. 
21 See Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 
TEXAS L. REv 842, 830-838 (1985). 
22 For most recent cases, see e.g., Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 
P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340,651 S.W.2d 90 (1983); 
Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983); Lujan v. Colorado 
State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Board of Educ., Levittown, Etc. v. Nyquist, 57 
N.Y.2d 227, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 439 N.E.2d 359 (1982); McDaniel v. Thomas 248 Ga. 632, 285 
S.E.2d 156 (1981). 
25 [d. 
24 See e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). 
25 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). 
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of five cities, brought an action maintaining that the state's public school financing system 
violated both federal and state equal protection, as well as the state constitutional pro-
vision for education, which provided for the "maintenance and support of a thorough 
and efficient system of free public schools."26 The plaintiffs claimed that the system's 
substantial reliance on local property tax revenues to finance public education produced 
gross disparities in the revenues available among different districts within the state.27 
They argued that the court must find a compelling state interest to uphold the present 
system against their equal protection claim for two reasons. First, the plaintiffs claimed 
that education is a fundamental right guaranteed by both the federal and states consti-
tutions, and, second, they claimed that they were a suspect class because the present 
system classified students according to their wealth.28 The Supreme Court of New 
Jersey disposed of the federal equal protection claim under the Supreme Court's ruling 
in Rodriguez,29 but acknowledged th;it a state constitution could require a more stringent 
standard of equal protection.30 The court, however, was hesitant to decide the case based 
upon the state equal protection clause, stating that "the equal protection clause may be 
unmanageable if it is called upon to supply categorical answers in the vast areas of 
human needs."31 
In its analysis of the plaintiffs' claim that education is a fundamental right, the court 
acknowledged that the New Jersey Constitution explicitly mandates education as a gov-
ernmental function; nevertheless, the court pointed out that a vast range of other 
services, such as police and fire protection are also explicitly provided for in the state 
constitution.32 Thus, under the plaintiff's reasoning, all governmental services mandated 
in the state constitution would have to be considered fundamental rights, rendering the 
classification unworkable.33 In disposing of the plaintiffs' claim that education is a fun-
damental right, the court rejected the test used by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez, by 
which a right is deemed fundamental only if it is explicitly or implicitly provided for in 
the U.S. Constitution.34 
The court also ruled against the plaintiffs' claim that that the state's system was 
suspect because it classified citizens on the basis of their wealth.35 On this claim, the 
court found that wealth is not "suspect" as a basis for raising revenues.36 The court 
stated that "residents of a political subdivision are permitted within substantial limits to 
decide how much to raise for services which are necessary or sufficiently desirable to 
justify the exertion of the taxing power."37 Therefore, the court reasoned, taxes in 
different taxing districts need not be uniform.38 Thus the court found that, absent the 
involvement of a fundamental right or a suspect classification, there need only be a 
26 N.]. CONST. 1947 art. VIII, § IV, par. 1. 
27 Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.].S. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972). 
28 See supra note 25 at 486, 303 A.2d at 279. 
29Id. at 486,303 A.2d at 281. 
30Id. at 490, 303 A.2d at 282. 
31Id. at 492, 303 A.2d at 283. 
32Id. at 497, 303 A.2d at 285. 
33Id. at 495-96, 303 A.2d at 284. 
34Id. at 497, 303 A.2d at 285. 
30 Id. at 492, 303 A.2d at 283. 
36 Id. 
37Id. at 493, 303 A.2d at 283. 
38Id. at 494, 303 A.2d at 283. 
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rational relation between the state's goal and its method of implementing that goaP9 
The state argued that the public interest is furthered when the residents of a locality 
are given a voice in the amount of services and expenditures because it stimulates citizen 
concern for the performance of those services.40 The court concluded that it may not 
be "irrational" to deal with education in those terms and upheld the state's system against 
the plaintiffs' equal protection claim.4l 
Instead, the court examined the meaning of the "thorough and efficient" clause in 
the New Jersey Constitution's education amendment, and found that while it did not 
call for statewide equality among taxpayers, it did intend to provide equal educational 
opportunity to the children of the state.42 The court interpreted the constitutional 
guarantee to an education as "embrac(ing) that educational opportunity which is needed 
in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen and a competitor in 
the labor market."43 Next the court determined whether the state had fulfilled its obli-
gation to provide all students with that level of educational opportunity that is contem-
plated by a thorough and efficient system of education. The court found that the 
constitutional demand had not been met. In reaching its decision, the court relied on 
the relevance of the discrepancies in dollar input per pupil to educational opportunity. 
The court justified its reliance on that criterion because it found that dollar input was 
plainly relevant and because defendants had shown no other viable criterion for mea-
suring compliance with the constitutional mandate.44 At the time of the trial, local taxes 
yielded 67% of the total operating expenses of the public schools.45 As a result, gross 
discrepancies in public school expenditures existed between districts throughout the 
state. Thus the Court found that a statutory scheme for financing public education which 
relied heavily on local taxation had no apparent relation to the constitutional mandate 
for equal educational opportunity.46 
2. Subsequent Successful Cases 
Courts in Arkansas, Wyoming, West Virginia, and Connecticut have also found that 
those states' systems of financing public schools are unconstitutional.4? In each state the 
court found that education is a fundamental right under the state constitution and, 
therefore, any discriminatory classification found in the state's educational financing 
system could not be upheld unless the state could demonstrate a compelling state interest 
to justify the unequal classification.48 
39 [d. at 499, 303 A.2d at 286. 
40 [d. 
41 [d. 
42 [d. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294. 
43 [d. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. 
44 [d. 
45 [d. at 480, 303 A.2d at 280. 
46 [d. at 516,303 A.2d at 296. 
47 Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279 Ark. 340, 651 S.W. 2d 90 (1983); Washakie Co. 
Sch. Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); Pauley v. Kelley, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 
S.E.2d 859 (1979); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d. 359 (1977). 
48 [d. 
1988] 
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In finding for the plaintiffs, the court in Horton v. Meskill concluded that "in Con-
necticut the right to education is so basic and fundamental that any infringement of that 
right must be strictly scrutinized."49 Unlike New Jersey, the Connecticut Constitution's 
education clause sets no qualitative standards for education whatsoever. Instead, it merely 
establishes that the state will provide free public elementary and secondary schools. 50 
The court, however, noted that the Connecticut General Assembly has stated that it is 
the concern of the state that "each child shall have ... equal opportunity to receive a 
suitable program of educational experiences."51 In relying on the legislature's interpre-
tation of the education clause of the state constitution, the court determined that it must 
strictly scrutinize the state's present system.52 Because the system resulted in gross dis-
crepancies in funding between school districts, the court ruled that the present system 
violated the plaintiffs' constitutional right to education.53 
b. West Virginia 
The West Virginia Constitution provides for a "thorough and efficient" system of 
public schools, like the New Jersey Constitution.54 In Pauley v. Kelly, the plaintiffs claimed 
that the state's present system violated the constitutional mandate for a "thorough and 
efficient" system because of interdistrict funding discrepancies.55 The plaintiffs also 
claimed that the system violated the state equal protection standard because education 
is a fundamental right of the people of West Virginia. 56 In its analysis, the court looked 
to the intentions of the framers of the state constitution to determine what was meant 
by that document's "thorough and efficient" clause, defining it as an education system 
that: 
develops as best the state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies 
and social morality of its charges to prepare them for useful and happy 
occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically.57 
In applying that definition to plaintiffs' schools, the court found them "woefully inade-
quate."58 
The court also found that under West Virginia's Constitution education is a consti-
tutionally derived right, and therefore fundamental, and invoked a strict scrutiny analysis 
of state's financing system.59 Because the state was unable to demonstrate a compelling 
state interest to justify the resulting unequal classification, the plaintiffs prevailed on the 
state equal protection claim as well. 
49 172 Conn. 615, 646, 376 A.2d 359,373 (1977). 
50 CONN. CONST. art. VIII, § I. 
51 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-4a. 
52 Horton, 172 Conn. at 649, 376 A.2d at 374. 
53 [d. at 650, 376 A.2d at 374. 
54 W.VA. CONST. art 12, § I. 
55162 W.Va. 672, 674, 255 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1979) 
56 !d. at 707, 255 S.E.2d at 878. 
57 !d. at 705, 255 S.E.2d at 877. 
58 [d. at 707, 255 S.E.2d at 878. 
59 [d. at 877. 
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c. Wyoming 
The Wyoming Constitution calls for "the establishment and maintenance of a com-
plete and uniform system of public instruction."60 In Washakie County School District No. 
One v. Herschler, the plaintiffs claimed that the state's public school financing system 
violated federal and state equal protection clauses as well as the state constitution's 
mandate for education.6' The court determined that in the state of Wyoming education 
is a fundamental interest.62 Therefore, the state's financing system must withstand strict 
scrutiny to be upheld against an equal protection claim under the state constitution.65 
In addition, the court stated that a classification based on wealth is considered suspect, 
and found that because Wyoming's financing system distributed funds on the basis of 
wealth it was a suspect classification.54 While stating that "exact or absolute equality is 
not required," the court proscribed "any system which makes the quality of a child's 
education a function of district wealth."65 The court determined that the plaintiffs' state 
equal protection rights had been violated by the state's system for funding public edu-
cation because of the dependence of education on the property tax resources of the local 
school district. 
d. Arkansas 
Plaintiffs in Dupree v. Alma School District No. 30 claimed that the Arkansas system 
of financing public schools violated both the state constitution's equal protection clause 
and the constitutional provision for education, which calls for a "general, suitable and 
efficient system of free public schools."66 The court found that the present system, which 
resulted in dollar per pupil discrepancies of nearly 3: 167 between districts, violated both 
the plaintiffs' right to equal protection under the state's laws68 and the state's constitu-
tional mandate for education.69 Unlike the New Jersey, Connecticut, West Virginia and 
Wyoming courts, where the defendants were required to show a compelling state interest 
to justify the fiscal inequality, the Arkansas Supreme Court merely applied minimum 
scrutiny to the state's plan and found that the system bore "no rational relationship to 
the educational needs of the individual districts."7o A system that is determined primarily 
by the tax base of each district, the court reasoned, "only promotes greater opportunities 
for the advantaged while diminishing the opportunities for the disadvantaged."7' The 
court also upheld the trial court's finding that the state's system violated Arkansas' 
constitutional mandate for education.72 
60 WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 1. 
61 606 P.2d 310, 315 (Wyo. 1980). 
62 /d. at 333. 
6. [d. at 335. 
64 [d. at 334. 
65 [d. at 336. 
66 ARK. CONST. art. XIV, § 1. 
67 279 Ark. 340, 344, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (1983). 
68Id. at 345, 651 S.W.2d at 93. 
69Id. at 347, 651 S.W.2d at 95. 
70 [d. at 345, 651 S.W.2d at 93. 
71 [d. 
72 [d. at 347, 651 S.W.2d at 95. 
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B. Unsuccessful Cases 
In other states where property based financing systems create disparities in educa-
tional funding between districts, challenges to state financing systems of public schools 
since the Rodriguez decision have been unsuccessful. 73 Most states have found that the 
federal equal protection standards are controlling, and following the United States 
Supreme Court in Rodiguez, have applied a rational basis test to determine whether state 
equal protection is violated by the states' system.74 Like Rodriguez, in each of these cases 
the court found that the state's interest in local control is a legitimate interest satisfied 
by the existing system. 7S However, most states that have considered the issue of whether 
education is a fundamental right have rejected the Rodriguez "explicitly or implicitly" 
guaranteed test. 76 Instead courts have justified their present systems by finding that no 
child is being totally deprived of a right to educational opportunity.77 In New York, the 
court justified applying only rational basis scrutiny because, despite the existence of 
disparities between districts, no authority was presented that discrimination between 
units of government (school districts) calls for any closer judicial scrutiny.78 In Maryland, 
the court framed the issue as whether anything in the Constitution, either federal or 
state, requires that the same amount of money should be spent on each child, or prohibits 
any county, regardless of wealth, from spending any more.79 In Oregon, the court upheld 
the system by applying a balancing test, weighing the interest impinged upon - edu-
cational opportunity - against the state objective in maintaining the present system of 
school financing - local control. 80 
These states have also upheld property based financing systems against allegations 
that the systems violate state constitution clauses providing for education. The Maryland 
Constitution provides for a "thorough and efficient" system of schools,sl like New Jersey; 
however the court interpreted this standard to mean "adequate" and stated that 
simply to show that the educational resources available in poorer districts 
are inferior to those in rich districts does not mean that there is insufficient 
funding provided by the state's financing scheme for all students t.o obtain 
an adequate education.82 
The court in New York, whose Constitution provides for the "maintenance and support 
of a system of free common schools,"83 and the courts in Washington and Oregon, whose 
Constitutions guarantee a "general and uniform"s4 system of schools found that consti-
tutional requirements were being met as long as plaintiffs could not show that students 
" For recent cases see e.g., Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 
1135 (Okla. 1987); Hornbeck v. Somerset Co. Board of Educ, 295 Md. 597,458 A.2d 758 (1983); 
Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982). 
74 [d. 
75 [d. 
76 See e.g., Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976). 
77 Id. at 21,554 P.2d at 147. 
78 Levittown, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 643,349 N.E.2d at 366. 
79 Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 658, 458 A.2d at 790. 
80 Olsen, 276 Or. at 20, 554 P.2d at 144. 
81 MD. CONST. art 8, § 1. 
82 Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780. 
8' N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 
84 WASH. CONST. art 9, § 2, OR. CONST. art VIII, § 3. 
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were being denied a minimum education.85 In Arizona, "general and uniform"86 was 
interpreted to simply mean schools that are available to citizens between the ages of 6 
and 21, and open a minimum of 6 months each year.87 In Idaho, where schools are 
constitutionally guaranteed to be "general, uniform, and thorough,"88 the court looked 
to the intent of the framers of the state constitution and, finding no indication of any 
requirement that the school system be equal, upheld that state's system.89 
In addition, courts have been reluctant to interfere with legislative schemes for 
public school financing fot fear of engaging in judicial legislation. The Idaho court 
refused to interfere with the state's system, stating that 
to do otherwise would be an unwise and unwarranted entry into the contro-
versial area of public school financing, whereby this court would convene as 
a 'super legislature', legislating in a turbulant field of social, economic, and 
political policy.90 
The Georgia court concurred with this analysis, adding that the court "lacks the expertise 
and familiarity with local problems so necessary to the making of wise decisions with 
respect to the raising and disposition of public revenues."9l In Washington, the court 
stated that the legislature and the Superintendent of Public Instruction, not the courts 
are the determinants of whether and in what manner the state's duty to make ample 
provision for the education of the state's children is to be discharged.92 In Ohio, the 
court recognized a duty to review the constitutionality of legislation, but finding that no 
student was actually being deprived of any educational opportunity at all, found that 
the General Assembly had not abused its "broad discretion" in creating the present 
system.93 
V. ANALYSIS 
An examination of state court decisions in public school financing litigation produces 
some striking contrasts and remarkable inconsistencies. Most notable has been the way 
in which courts in different states have interpreted the meaning of identical and like 
constitutional mandates for education. As a result, courts have come to opposite conclu-
sions in otherwise similar cases. A "thorough and efficient" system of schools in New 
Jersey has been understood by the judiciary to mean equal educational opportunity to 
all children.94 The same phrase, however, to courts in Maryland and Ohio merely 
contemplates the provision of a basic or minimum standard of education.95 In Wyoming, 
the constitutional mandate of a "complete and uniform" system of public schools could 
85 Olsen, 276 Or. at 27, 554 P.2d at 148; Northshore School District No. 417 v. Kinnear, 84 
Wash.2d 685, 729, 530 P.2d 178,202 (1975). 
86 ARIZ. CONST. art XI,§ 1. 
87 Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 90, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (1973). 
88 IDAHO CONST. art IX, § 1. 
89 Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 805, 537 P.2d 635, 652 (1975). 
90 [d. at 798, 537 P.2d at 640. 
91 McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 647, 285 S.E.2d 156, 167 (1981). 
92 Kinnear, 84 Wash.2d at 715, 530 P.2d at 195. 
93 Bd. of Ed. of City Sch. Dist. Etc. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d 368, 387, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825. 
94 Robinson, 62 N.]. at 513,303 N.E.2d at 294. 
95 Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 639, 458 A.2d at 780; Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d at 388, 390 N.E.2d at 
825. 
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not tolerate a system which relied on local wealth for financing,96 whereas similar lan-
gauge in Oregon and Colorado was found to require only that a minimum of educational 
opportunity was made available.97 In Connecticut, the state Constitution mandates only 
that "there shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state,"98 
yet the court found that this language established education as a fundamental right, and 
struck down that state's present financing scheme.99 Conversely, in Arizona, where ed-
ucation was found to be a fundamental right under the state constitutional provision 
providing· for the "establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public 
school system," a school system which is merely open 6 months a year and available to 
all citizens ages 6-21 satisfies this requirement. 100 
In many states where financing systems have been upheld, the courts have given 
great deference to the legislation, fearing that examining the statutes too closely would 
entail judicial intervention into an area reserved for the legislature. Courts have been 
hesitant to give substantive definitions to states' education clauses, and are therefore 
unwilling to establish standards by which statutory schemes will meet constitutional 
requirements. Courts have found that this duty belongs to the legislature, not to the 
judiciary. Thus, courts have been very willing to accept state arguments for the promotion 
of local control over schools as a legitimate justification for the inequalities of the existing 
financing schemes. 
Yet, many dissenting judges and commentators have pointed out that this argument, 
upon closer scrutiny, is lacking in substance. Proponents of many existing schemes argue 
for the benefits that local control gives over meeting specific local needs, such as providing 
money for experimentation and innovation, and the planning of extracurricular activi-
ties. However, such benefits are only possible where a district has the money to afford 
them. Many school districts are fighting to provide the bare minimum of education with 
the funds that they have available. In Ohio, a number of school districts actually closed 
due to fiscal impossibilities. lOl The dissenting opinion in Hornbeck v. Somerset County Board 
of Education states: 
Local control is an elusive term to those jurisdictions that do not have enough 
funds to make decisions about what resources will benefit their children. 
Whatever benefits local control may entail, they certainly do not justify a 
system giving a vastly inferior educational opportunity to students in poor 
jurisdictions throughout the state. 102 
Many courts have also been reluctant to find a relevant relationship between edu-
cational opportunity and educational funding. Yet, while other factors admittedly can 
affect educational underachievement, the availability of funding is significant. The court 
in McDaniel v. Thomas, while upholding Georgia's system, acknowledged that: 
disparities in funding also affect the availability of textbooks, library books, 
audio-visual equipment, supplies, counseling and testing services, and extra-
96 Herschler, 606 P.2d at 336. 
97 Olsen, 276 Or. at 27; 554 P.2d at 148; Lujan 649 P.2d at 1025. 
98 See supra note 50. 
99 Horton, 172 Conn. at 650, 376 A.2d at 374. 
100 Shofstall, 110 Ariz. at 90,515 P.2d at 592. 
101 Walter, 58 Ohio St.2d at 394, 390 N.E.2d at 829. 
102 Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 686, 458 A.2d at 805. 
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curricular activities as well as the conditions of school buildings and 
grounds. I03 
In addition, as the dissenting opinion in Thompson v. Engelking pointed out: 
clearly a school district would have a great deal of difficulty offering a 
competent chemistry program if it were unable to purchase the proper 
equipment and materials. Yet a wealthy district would have little trouble 
offering such a program. 104 
Claims of equal protection violations have also produced different outcomes in state 
courts. Many states have followed the standard established by the Supreme Court in 
Rodriguez, and applied the two tiered test utilized by the Court in that case. I05 Like the 
Court in Rodriguez, these courts have failed to find the plaintiffs a suspect class or 
education a fundamental right, and thus have upheld state financing systems based on 
the finding of a rational relation between the financing scheme and the states' interest 
in local control over the schools. I06 Those states that have applied strict scrutiny to their 
financing schemes, based on the finding that education is a fundamental right or that 
the plaintiffs are a suspect class, have all found state equal protection violations. 107 
States which have followed the Rodriguez equal protection analysis, however, have 
also rejected that case's test for determining when a right should be considered funda-
mental. 108 State constitutions, unlike the federal Constitution, are not of limited powers 
and specifically provide for a vast range of services, thus making unworkable a test that 
bases fundamentality on whether a right is explicitly or implicitly granted in the Consti-
tution. The fundamentality of education is therefore based on a subjective judicial 
standard that varies from state to state. Many state courts, while not finding educational 
opportunity a fundamental right guaranteed by the state constitution, nonetheless have 
stressed the importance of education and the vital role that it plays in society. The court 
in New York stated that: 
public education is unquestionably high on the list of priorities of govern-
mental concern and responsibility, involving the expenditure of enormous 
sums of State and local revenue, enlisting the most active attention of our 
citizenry and of our Legislature, and manifested by express articulation in 
our state Constitution. 109 
However, under the two-tiered equal protection analysis used by the Supreme Court 
in Rodriguez, a right that is not deemed fundamental is given no greater judicial scrutiny 
when a violation is alleged than the rational relationship test. Thus, under this analysis, 
courts must take an all or nothing approach to reviewing the constitutionality of statutory 
schemes affecting educational opportunity. Consequently, courts have been forced to 
endorse school financing schemes even though many of those same courts have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the present systems. For example, in Oregon, where the system was 
upheld, the court stated that: 
103 McDaniel, 248 Ga. at 638, 285 S.E.2d at 161. 
104 Thompson, 96 Idaho at 824,537 P.2d at 666. 
100 See supra note 73. 
106 [d. 
107 Herschler, 606 P.2d 310; Pauley, 162 W.Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859, Horton, 172 Conn. 615. 
108 Olsen, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139. 
109 Levittown, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650, 439 N.E.2d at 366. 
1988] PUBliC SCHOOL FINANCING 
our decision should not be interpreted to mean that we are of the opinion 
that the Oregon system of school financing is politically or educationally 
desirable. Our only role is to pass upon its constitutionality.IIO 
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In Georgia, the court qualified its decision upholding the state's system by stating that: 
our holding that the current system of financing public education in Georgia 
is not unconstitutional should not be construed as an endorsement of the 
status quo .... It is clear that a great deal more can be done and needs to be 
done to equalize educational opportunities in this state. III 
Courts have recognized that an education is more important than many other social 
welfare benefits. Therefore the two-tiered approach to judicial analysis of state public 
school financing schemes is not adequate to evaluate effectively the method by which a 
state provides educational opportunity to its citizens. 
It is necessary that courts apply a degree of judicial scrutiny to these cases which 
enables courts to recognize education as a vital and important interest. Courts must 
ensure that states are providing all their citizens with an equal opportunity to an adequate 
education. This must be done, however, recognizing the benefits of decision-making by 
a local electorate and preventing judicial intrusion into the legislative function. Courts 
must not be allowed to substitute their own educational policies and preferences for 
those of elected school officials, administrators, teachers and parents. 
Since Rodriguez, the Supreme Court has developed intermediate (middle) level scru-
tiny, by which the means chosen by a state must be substantially related to the achieve-
ment of an important objective.1ll This is the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to be 
applied in evaluating claims of equal protection violations under state public school 
financing systems. 
Intermediate level scrutiny has been applied in cases involving gender-based clas-
sifications,m illegitimacy,1I4 and alienage. ll5 In Plyler v. Doe, the Court applied interme-
diate scrutiny to find that a Texas statute which withheld from local school districts any 
state funds for the education of children who were not "legally admitted" into the United 
States violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 116 In so doing, 
while acknowledging that education is not a fundamental right, the Court discussed the 
importance of education and distinguished it from other governmental benefits and 
social welfare legislation.1l7 In quoting Abington School District v. Schempp, the Court stated 
that "we have recognized the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the 
preservation of a democratic system of government."IIS In addition, the Court stated 
that "education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society"119 and 
that "illiteracy is an enduring disability. The inability to read and write will handicap the 
110 Olsen, 276 Or at 27, 554 P.2d at 149. 
111 McDaniel, 248 Ga. at 648, 285 S.E.2d at 169. 
112 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
lIS [d. 
114 Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1982). 
115 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
116 [d. at 224. 
117 [d. at 221 
118/d. 
119 [d. 
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individual deprived of a basic education each and every day of his life."120 The Court 
has recognized that the right to an education, although not explicitly granted in the 
federal Constitution, nonetheless has a fundamental role in society. The deprivation of 
an education harms an individual in a deep and enduring way.121 It necessarily must 
follow that an alleged violation of the right to an education deserves closer judicual 
scrutiny than merely requiring a showing by a state of a rational basis for a discriminatory 
scheme. 
Under the Plyler analysis, once the plaintiffs establish a prima facie case of unequal 
treatment, the defendants bear the burden of proving that the disparate treatment of 
school children furthers a substantial government interest. 122 This analysis should be 
employed in school financing case as well. Courts would then be called upon to consider 
whether taxing local property to fund schools is a scheme that furthers the government's 
interest in local control of public schools, and whether that interest is a substantial one. 
While the benefits of local control over public schools are many and may be considered 
legally "important," it is not likely that courts will find that a funding scheme that creates 
gross inequities in educational opportunity is substantially related to furthering those 
interests. Under intermediate scrutiny, public school financing systems that are based on 
local property tax would have to be found constitutionally invalid. 
In addition, courts are free to protect individual rights more fully under state 
constitutional provisions than the level of protection granted under the federal Consti-
tution. State courts have done so in many areas of the law, such as criminal procedure, 
land use, as well as education funding. 123 Thus, although the Supreme Court has refused 
to recognize education as a fundamental right under the federal Constitution, or wealth 
as a suspect class, state courts are free to make such findings. Strict scrutiny of a public 
school financing scheme can be the appropriate level of review by a state court regardless 
of the federal standard. At the very least, however, claims of equal protection violations 
by public school financing systems, at both the state and federal level, should be evaluated 
using intermediate judicial scrutiny. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Equal educational opportunity is a necessity in granting all citizens the right to self-
determination and in maximizing the productivity of society. It is a means of granting 
all children, wealthy or poor, the opportunity to develop their skills and abilities to their 
fullest potential. Such an opportunity should not be provided only to those who happen 
to live in school districts that can afford education and be denied to those who live in 
districts which cannot. Public school financing systems based on local property taxes are 
creating basic educational opportunities that are available only to the wealthy and thus 
serve to perpetuate a class of poor and uneducated citizens. 
120 [d. at 222. 
121 See id. at 217-18, 230. 
122 See Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 
TEXAS L. REV. 842 (1985). 
123 See e.g., State v. Culotta, 343 So.2d 977, 981-82 (La. 1976)(search and seizure standing); 
State v. Brecht, 157 Mont. 264, 485 P.2d 47 (1971)(private party searches); Southern Burlington 
County NAACP v. Township of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.]. 151,336 A.2d 713 (1975)(zoning ordinance); 
cert. denied 423 u.S. 808 (1975); Washakie County School Dist. No. One v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 
319 (Wyo) (school financing), cert denied 449 U.S. 824 (1980). 
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Courts should examine public school financing cases under a standard of review 
that demands that the defendants prove that an important government interest is sub-
stantially furthered by local property tax based funding scheme. Under this degree of 
scrutiny local property tax based financing systems cannot be upheld. Legislators are not 
omnipotent, and courts should not close their eyes to controversial areas by pleading 
deference. The courts have a duty to interpret the Constitution, and to review the 
constitutionality of legislative schemes, regardless of the potential consequences or at-
tending controversy. 
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